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Much work has been done in recent years concerning private label and national brands. 
The analyses have looked into the explosion of private label goods on the market, the 
competition with national brands, pricing strategies, and reasons for a retailer to introduce 
a private label good. The price competition between national brands and private label 
brands has largely been observed and studied at the retail level. Usually price games are 
analyzed to see which good is leading or affecting the other goods and prices. Many of 
these studies also look at what types of promotions and the level of advertising used for 
each type of good.  
“The extant literature on private labels has not directly addressed the strategic role 
of private labels in the channel relationship between the national brand manufacturers and 
the retailer.”(Narasimhan). The relationship between the manufacturers producing the 
private label goods and the retailers selling them is an important issue. It is of interest to 
know who owns production or contracts to produce these private label goods and what 
effect this has on the pricing of goods at the manufacturer and retail level. Dunne(1996) 
states that it is rare for a manufacturer of a national brand to supply a private label good 
because consumers may learn of this and no longer buy the national brand if the goods 
are perceived to be the same. Giblen(1993) notes that retailers utilize private label goods 
as bargaining tools against national branded manufacturers. However, some national 
brand manufacturers do in fact produce private label goods. Also, the retailer could 
produce its own good or contract for the private label good with a non-national brand 
supplier. Several different market structures exist.   3
  This article seeks to analyze three different market structures to observe the 
prices, quantity of goods sold, and profits for the firms involved. All cases will involve a 
single retailer. Manufacturers will produce and sell national branded goods and private 
label goods to retailers. In case one there will be national brand manufacturers and a 
separate manufacturer producing the private label good. In case two the private label 
good is produced by the retailer and the national brands are supplied from other 
manufacturers. Lastly, case three will consist of manufacturers of a national brand firm 
that also contract with the retailer to produce private label goods.  
The first section of this article will obtain pricing response functions for the 
retailer and manufacturers. The market structure cases to be analyzed then will be 
discussed in greater detail. Following this, an empirical example using ready-to-eat 
cereals will be conducted. Results will then be discussed and conclusions will be drawn 




This outlay is based on the work of Iwata(1974). 
Retailer's Profit 
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where  Pi is retail price of good i , Wi is the manufacturer price , Qi is quantity of i sold  
 
  Pj’s are retail prices of other brands the retailer sells in the same category with i 
 
 
First Order Conditions 
 
Since it is assumed that the retailer control prices. First order conditions are derived with  
 
respect to retail price. 
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By placing into matrix form the retail prices can be solved for in terms of manufacturer  
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Final response functions for retail prices in terms of manufacturer prices and 
matrix products Vi and Vj are now solved. The matrix products Vi and Vj take into 
account cross-price effects of the goods that the retailer sells. The retail price results in 
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Response Functions-Manufacturer-( 1 good) 
 
Next, a response function for the manufacturer is derived. The first case is if each  
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where Ci is the cost of production of good i 
 
First order conditions for the manufacturer 
 
Since it is assumed that the manufacturer controls the price charged to the retailer. First  
 
order conditions are derived with respect to manufacturer’s price. 
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The final response function is in terms of the production cost and own-price 
elasticity. The manufacturer price for the one good case does not consider cross price 










Response Functions-Manufacturer-( More than 1 good) 
 
After deriving the response function for a manufacturer of only one good, the response 
functions for a manufacturer producing more than one good are obtained. Cross-price 




() ( ) ( ) ( ) j i j j j j i i i i w P , P Q C W P , P Q C W − + − = π  
 
First order conditions for the manufacturer 
 
Since it is assumed that the manufacturer controls its price charged to the retailer. First  
 
order conditions are derived with respect to manufacturer’s price. 
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By placing into matrix form the manufacturer’s prices can be solved for in terms of  
 
production costs, retail prices, shares, and elasticities. 























































































































































































































Final manufacturer response functions are in terms of production costs and matrix 
products Ji and Jj from the manufacturer as well as portions of the retailer’s response 
function, Vi and Vj. These can be found for all goods produced by the manufacturer. The 
manufacturer now prices their goods by taking into account the cross-price effects in the 


















  Now that response functions have been expressed in matrix form, the V and J 
products will be explicitly expressed for in the context of a two good case. The 
elasticities and budget shares effects on manufacturer and retail prices will be shown.   8
Numeric solutions to the response functions can be retrieved with the previous forms in 
terms of matrix products. This presentation gives an in depth look at the functions. 
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Manufacturer Response Function – elasticity form 
 










Producing more than 1 good -(2 good case) 
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Market Structure Discussion 
 
Now that all response functions have been developed, the three cases described earlier 
can be explored. For case one, the manufacturers establish their prices for each good that 
they produce and then the retailer responds. There is a separate manufacturer for each 
national brand and a separate manufacturer for the private label. Each manufacturer will 
price their good based on the own price elasticity and production cost to maximize profit. 
The retailer then appropriately prices to maximize total profit considering all goods sold. 
In case two the retailer owns and produces the private label good. “Mills (1995) 
shows that private labels can serve as a “retailer instrument” for overcoming the double-
marginalization problem, thereby improving the performance in the distribution 
channel.”(Putsis). Thus, the markup given by the retailer/manufacturer for the private 
label good will be less in the manufacturer response function for the private label good 
and can then be priced lower in the retail market as a result. The other manufacturers will 
price as in case one. The retailer then prices as in case one but uses the lower level 
markup on the private label good that it produces in the response function. 
In case three, a select manufacturer will be producing both their national brand 
and the private label good for the retailer. The manufacturer will impose the response   10
function for more than one good since it will know that the private label good it is 
producing will compete with its own brand. Since it has pricing control at this stage, it 
will alter the pricing decision charged to the retailer. Again, the other manufacturers and 
retailer will price as in case one.  
 
An Example: ready-to-eat cereals 
 
An empirical example using ready-to-eat cereals will now be conducted to explore these 
three market structures. The key analysis will be focused on private label ownership as 
previously discussed. First the data will be briefly described followed by the derivation of 
the needed elasticities for the response functions. Elasticities will be derived from a 
Rotterdam model. Lastly, Pi’s, Qi’s, Wi’s, and profits for all firms will be retrieved for 




The data used is publicly available scanner data obtained from the Kilts Center for 
Marketing, University of Chicago. The data is from Dominick's Finer Foods, a grocery 
store that operates over 100 stores in the Chicago area. The data contains approximately 
nine years of store level data. This analysis uses an 87-week period ranging from August 
1995 until May 1997. The ready-to-eat breakfast cereals category was used. The price, 
unit sold, profit margin, week, UPC, and store are given for each store level purchase. All 
UPC’s were aggregated to three national brands(Post, General Mills, Kellogg’s), the 
private label brand(Dominick’s), and a last category for all other cereals. This gives the 
necessary pieces to analyze the different market structures. A nice feature of this data is 





The Rotterdam model (Theil, Barten) will be used to retrieve elasticities for the ready-to-
eat cereals. A systems approach is used since all cereals are interrelated and more 
efficient estimates can be retrieved. The model is also flexible and compatible with 
demand theory(Mountain). A recent article indicated that the Rotterdam system was 
appropriate for this type of data since the log-differencing helps overcome the common 
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where D denotes the logarithmic first difference operator 
 
1 t t x ln x ln Dx − − =  
      
where    si : budget share of good i 
              qi : quantity of cereal i consumed   
              pj : price of cereal j(also includes own price pi)   
              a, b, c : parameters to be estimated   
              i ,: respective cereal  
 
N-1 equations are estimated in a system using SUR. Homogeneity and adding up 
restrictions are enforced allowing the remaining estimates to be recovered. 
 Homogeneity   ∑j Cij = 0  for all i 
Adding Up    ∑iBi = 0 
 
The theoretical assumption of symmetry will not be imposed on the system for 
this analysis. “Cross price elasticities are decidedly asymmetric with national brand price 
having a major impact on private label sales, whereas private label price has very little   12
impact on private label sales. This is consistent with the work on asymmetric competition 
and price tiers”(Cotterrill, Putsis) and (Cotterrill, Putsis, Dhar). 
 
A serial autocorrelation correction is made to the basic system since times series data is  
 
being used. The final Rotterdam system used is the following: 
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Compensated price elasticities and expenditure elasticities derived at the mean budget  
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Uncompensated price elasticities are calculated as follows: 
 
() i j mean ij ij N S * E E − =  
 
Uncompensated elasticities are used in the previously derived first order conditions to  
 





The compensated and uncompensated elasticities for ready-to-eat cereals are given in the 
table 1. All own-price elasticities are negative and statistically significant from zero. All 
cereals were substitutes for each other as expected but were not all statistically significant 
substitutes. The elasticities were asymmetric concerning the private label and national 
brand relationships. Dominick’s brand did not significantly affect any of the three 
national brands or the Other cereal brands. Two of the national brands, Kellogg’s and   13
General Mills, did significantly affect the Dominick’s brand. The uncompensated 
elasticities are used for the response functions. 
The three cases of market structure were calculated and results are given in the 
table 2. For case one each manufacturer priced their own cereal. The retailer then priced. 
This gave the Pi’s and Wi’s. These were fed into the estimated demand systems to 
compute the quantity of each cereal sold and then profits were estimated for the retailer 
and manufacturers. In case one, the retailer’s average weekly profit was 514,273 dollars. 
Kellogg’s profit was the highest among the manufacturers since it sold the most. The 
average prices per ounce are also given under this case. 
For case two the retailer now produced and owned the Dominick’s brand. The 
markup was set to 80% of what would have occurred in case one to lower the realized 
price Wi. This is arbitrarily done to take into account the absence of double 
marginalization. Ownership of the production of the private label by the retailer results in 
a lower retail price being charged and an increased sales volume. However, total profit is 
lower for the retailer since the private label good is reducing sales of Post, General Mills, 
and Other cereals. The store was making a per unit profit on the sales of these goods so 
overall the effect of pricing their own good lower hurts their average weekly profit by 
nearly four thousand dollars. 
Case three looks into the retailer contracting with one of the major suppliers of 
branded cereal to produce the private label. Three separate major manufacturers exist in 
this example; Post, General Mills, and Kellogg’s. Results are found for the case of each 
firm producing the private label with the remaining manufacturers producing only their 
brand. In each case, the major firm takes into account the substitution effects of their   14
brand and the private label as outlined in the response functions for manufacturers 
producing more than one good. This results in the firms raising the price of the private 
label good charged to the retailer which transforms into a higher retail price. The ability 
to price this good is beneficial for each firm when they are allowed the chance to produce 
the private label good. Kellogg’s exploits the pricing of the private label good greatly 
when compared to Post and General Mills.  
The retailer earns the greatest profit in case three regardless of which 
manufacturer it contracts with. After analyzing the three separate market structures it 
appears that the retailer should contract to have the private label cereal made. The 
manufacturers are also best under this case and prefer to be the company supplying the 
private label cereal. This does not take into account the bargaining power retailers could 
gain from producing the private label goods. The retailers could still bargain over shelf 




An analysis of the two-stage game between manufacturers and retailers has been 
outlined. Response functions showing how prices are set have been derived for the case 
of a manufacturer producing one and multiple goods and for a retailer selling multiple 
goods. The functions were expressed in terms of elasticities, budget shares, and variable 
production costs so that an analysis could be easily performed. An application using 
ready-to-eat cereals was conducted to investigate pricing structure and ownership of 
private label cereals.  
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Table 1. Cereal Elasticities From the Rotterdam Model 
 
Uncompensated Elasticities 
  Post GM  Kellogg's Dom.  PL  Other TE 
Post -3.365  0.712 0.750 0.328 0.198 1.377 
  [.000] [.008] [.002] [.299] [.387] [.000] 
GM  0.491 -2.487 0.694 0.010 0.304 0.989 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.949] [.006] [.000] 
Kellogg's 0.161  0.495  -2.083 0.240 0.326 0.861 
  [.216] [.000] [.000] [.111] [.003] [.000] 
Dom. PL  0.191  1.552  0.584  -3.225  0.393  0.506 
  [.468] [.000] [.010] [.000] [.073] [.015] 
Other 0.190 0.554 0.672 0.078 -2.671 1.177 




  Post GM  Kellogg's  Dom.  PL  Other 
Post -3.190 1.136 1.260 0.384 0.409 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.220] [.069] 
GM  0.617 -2.182 1.060 0.050 0.455 
  [.000] [.000] [.000] [.738] [.000] 
Kellogg's  0.271 0.760 -1.764 0.275 0.458 
  [.038] [.000] [.000] [.065] [.000] 
Dom.  PL  0.255 1.708 0.771 -3.204 0.470 
  [.331] [.000] [.001] [.000] [.029] 
Other 0.340 0.917 1.107 0.126 -2.490 
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